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Abstract We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives.
We assume that players have incomplete information—with private values—about the
preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity
functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, i.e., there is a game
form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same
as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure
strategies) for any preference profile.
JEL Classification C62 · C70 · D82
1 Introduction
An effectivity function (Moulin and Peleg 1982) describes the allocation of power
among coalitions of individuals. More precisely, given a set of individuals and a
set of alternatives, an effectivity function assigns to each coalition of individuals a
collection of subsets of alternatives. Effectivity functions derive from many concepts
in game theory and social choice theory: for example game forms, social choice
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to describe the distribution of power or rights. For instance, a constitution can be
modelled as an effectivity function (Gärdenfors 1981; Peleg 1998): alternatives are
social states, and to say that a coalition is effective for a set of alternatives means that
this group of individuals is legally entitled to the social state being in the designated
set.
According to this last interpretation an effectivity function is a centralized concept
describing the rights of individuals. This leads directly to the question whether we can
find a set of decentralized rules (practical laws) such that individuals and coalitions,
by acting according to these rules, obtain the same rights as described by the effec-
tivity function. In more formal terms: can we find a game form which provides all
coalitions with the same power as the effectivity function? This question was already
answered in Moulin (1983), who showed that any monotonic and superadditive effec-
tivity function can be represented by a game form. An important further question is
whether we can find rules (in accordance with the constitution) such that there is a
situation in which the society is stable, that is, in some state of equilibrium. Peleg et al.
(2002) answered this question by characterizing effectivity functions that have a Nash
consistent representation, i.e., a game form representing the effectivity function and
having a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences of the individuals. See Peleg
and Peters (2010) for an extensive treatment of this topic and related issues.
An important open question in this area is the following. If we take into account
that information may be incomplete—individuals are not sure about the preferences,
i.e., types, of other individuals—when is it possible to have a representation of an
effectivity function that is Bayesian Nash consistent? d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988)
consider ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees: they
study effectivity functions derived from simple games and their representation by
so-called decision schemes, which assign probability distributions over the alterna-
tives, such that there exists a Bayesian incentive compatible Nash equilibrium under
incomplete information with private values. Recently, Peleg and Zamir (2014) show
that, without additional restrictions except for the standard ones, effectivity functions
can be Bayesian Nash consistently represented by generalized decision schemes; their
proof of this result uses the uniform core (Abdou and Keiding 1991). The question
under which conditions such a representation by a deterministic game form exists,
remains open.
In the present paper we consider the case of incomplete information with private
values: the preference of a type of a player does not depend on the types of the other
players. Compared to d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) and Peleg and Zamir (2014) we
impose a considerably stronger requirement: given an effectivity function, when does
there exist a representing game form such that, for any information structure (i.e.,
vector of type sets of the players), there exists an ex post Nash equilibrium for any
preference profile, that is, a strategy combination which results in a Nash equilibrium
for every realization of the types?
On the one hand, this is a very desirable situation, since players do not have to
rely on their beliefs about the types of the others, and they do not have to spend
time and effort on finding out the types of the other players. Moreover, every ex post
equilibrium has the no regret property which means that no player has an incentive
to change his action even if he were to be informed of the true types of the other
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players. These considerations are similar to the ones justifying implementation in
ex post Nash equilibrium (e.g., Bergemann and Morris 2008). It is also a first step
towards characterizing Bayesian Nash consistent representations, as every ex post
Nash equilibrium is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for any vector of beliefs.
On the other hand, as can be expected, this requirement turns out to be rather
restrictive. Our main result is as follows. An effectivity function (for n individuals or
players) has an ex post Nash consistent representation exactly if there exists an (n−1)-
player coalition and a subsetC of alternatives for which this coalition is effective, such
that all other (n −1)-player coalitions are effective for all singletons in this set C . The
intuition behind this condition is that in equilibrium there is one player restricted to
choose his most preferred alternative from C , while all other players are restricted in
such a way that they are not able to influence the outcome by unilateral deviation. In
the case n = 2 this condition is equivalent to at least one of the two players being a
so-called singleton player: a singleton player is a player for whom all minimal sets
for which this player is effective, are singletons. We also show that, if only one of the
players has more than one type, then ex post Nash consistency imposes no additional
restrictions compared to Nash consistency (as in Peleg et al. 2002). In the final part
of the paper we provide a short discussion on effectivity functions that have no ex
post Nash consistent representation, but for which a representation exists if we restrict
the number of types—a special case being the mentioned one where only one player
has more than one type. Throughout the paper we concentrate on existence of ex post
Nash equilibria and leave other possible properties (e.g., Pareto optimality of such
equilibria) from consideration.
The approach of looking for equilibrium consistent representations of effectivity
functions should be distinguished from the approach followed by implementation the-
ory. Suppose we are given a social choice correspondence. In implementation theory
one looks for a game form of which, for each profile of preferences, the set of equi-
librium outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes assigned by the social choice
correspondence. No condition is put on off equilibrium outcomes. In contrast, in an
equilibrium consistent representation the outcomes attainable in the game form by
individuals and coalitions should coincide with the outcomes attainable via the social
choice correspondence or, equivalently, its associated effectivity function. In this sense,
requiring equilibrium consistent representation is a strengthening compared to imple-
mentation; the weakening is that only existence of an equilibrium outcome is required.
Nevertheless, for a given equilibrium consistent representing game form, one can con-
struct a social choice correspondence by assigning all equilibrium outcomes to a given
preference profile; then, obviously, this social choice correspondence is implemented
by the game form.
The literature on implementation theory also deals with implementation in ex post
equilibrium. This solution concept is mainly used in situations with interdependent
valuations, because of tractability and robustness against informational assumptions.
Several authors show that for one-dimensional signals, ex post implementation is
possible if the single crossing property is satisfied (Cremer and McLean 1985; Das-
gupta andMaskin 2000; Bergemann and Välimäki 2002; Perry and Reny 2002). More
recent work deals with ex post equilibria in multidimensional signal settings. Jehiel
et al. (2006) show that the only ex post implementable social choice functions in a
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generic class of environments are constant functions, whereas Bergemann and Mor-
ris (2008) provide conditions for full implementation in ex post equilibrium if the
genericity requirement fails.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces definitions and
notations. In Sect. 3, we present our basic representing game form. This game form
is extended and modified in several ways in the rest of the paper. Section 4 analyzes
the case of two players, and Sect. 5 generalizes to more than two players.
Notation For a finite set D, |D| denotes the number of elements of D; P(D) denotes
the set of all subsets of D; P0(D) denotes the set of all non-empty subsets of D.
2 The model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} (where n ≥ 2) be the set of players, and let A be a finite set
of alternatives, |A| ≥ 2. A binary relation R over A is a subset R ⊆ A × A, where
(a, b) ∈ R is written as aRb (read aRb as a is weakly preferred over b). A binary
relation is complete if for all a, b ∈ A, we have aRb or bRa. A binary relation
is transitive if aRb and bRc jointly imply aRc, for all a, b, c ∈ A. A preference
ordering R on A is a complete and transitive binary relation. The set of all preference
orderings on A is denoted by W . If R ∈ W and a, b ∈ A, then aPb means aRb
and not bRa. If a ∈ A and R ∈ W , then L(a, R) = {b ∈ A | aRb} is the lower
contour set of a, i.e. the set of alternatives not strictly preferred to a. For a set S,
W S = { f | f : S → W } is the set of mappings from S to W.
An effectivity function (EF) is a function E :P(N ) → P(P0(A)) that satisfies the
following conditions: (i) E(N ) = P0(A); (ii) E(∅) = ∅; and (iii) A ∈ E(S) for all
S ∈ P0(N ). As a general interpretation, B ∈ E(S) means that coalition S can force
the final alternative to be an element of B. The interpretation of the three conditions is
fairly obvious: (i) the grand coalition has complete power in terms of E , (ii) the empty
set has no power, and (iii) an alternative from A must prevail.
An effectivity function E is monotonic (with respect to players as well as alterna-
tives) if
[B ∈ E(S), B ′ ∈ P0(A), B ⊆ B ′, and S ⊆ S′] ⇒ B ′ ∈ E(S′).
For B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N ), B is minimal for coalition S if B ∈ E(S) and there
is no B ′ ∈ E(S) such that B ′  B. A monotonic effectivity function E is completely
determined by these minimal sets.
The effectivity function E is superadditive if
[Bi ∈ E(Si ), i = 1, 2, and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅] ⇒ B1 ∩ B2 ∈ E(S1 ∪ S2).
Note that a superadditive effectivity function is alsomonotonic with respect to players:
for S ⊆ S′ and B ∈ E(S), superadditivity implies that B = B ∩ A ∈ E(S ∪
(S′\S)) = E(S′). Monotonicity and superadditivity are natural properties in view
of the interpretation given above. Moreover, effectivity functions derived from game
forms have these properties.
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The polar of E is the effectivity function E∗ defined by: E∗(∅) = ∅, and for
S ∈ P0(N )
E∗(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | B ∩ B ′ = ∅ for all B ′ ∈ E(N\S)}.
Thus, if B ∈ E∗(S), then the complementary coalition N\S cannot prevent S from
obtaining an alternative from B; in particular, A\B /∈ E(N\S). The function E∗
reflects a weaker effectivity condition than E : whereas E tells us what each coalition
can guarantee on its own, E∗ tells us what each coalition cannot be kept from.
E is maximal if E is superadditive and E = E∗. Observe that if E is superadditive,
then E(S) ⊆ E∗(S) for all S: if B ∈ E(S) then superadditivity implies B ∩ B ′ = ∅
for all B ′ ∈ E(N\S), so that B ∈ E∗(S). Also notice that a maximal effectivity
function is monotonic. Indeed, a superadditive effectivity function is monotonic with
respect to players; and if B ∈ E∗(S) and B ⊆ C , then obviously C ∩ B ′ = ∅ for all
B ′ ∈ E(N\S) and thus C ∈ E∗(S). Hence, if E is maximal then E is monotonic with
respect to alternatives since E∗ is.
The following results are well-known (e.g., Peleg and Peters 2010; Boros et al.
2010; or Crama and Hammer 2011). For completeness, we provide the proofs.
Proposition 2.1 Let E be a monotonic effectivity function. The following statements
are equivalent:
(i) E = E∗.
(ii) For all B ∈ P0(A) and for all S ∈ P0(N ), B ∈ E(S) if and only if B ∩ B ′ = ∅
for all B ′ ∈ E(N\S).
(iii) For all B ∈ P0(A) and for all S ∈ P0(N ), B ∈ E(S) if and only if A\B /∈
E(N\S).
Proof The implication (i) ⇒ (i i) is obvious. To prove implication (i i) ⇒ (i i i),
assume (i i). If B ∈ E(S) for some B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N ), then, by (i i),
A\B /∈ E(N\S). Conversely, if A\B /∈ E(N\S) for some B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N ),
then by (i i) theremust be some B ′ ∈ E(S) such that (A\B)∩B ′ = ∅. Clearly, B ′ ⊆ B,
so that B ∈ E(S), again by (i i).
Finally, to prove the implication (i i i) ⇒ (i), assume (i i i). If B ∈ E∗(S) for
some B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N ), then A\B /∈ E(N\S), hence B ∈ E(S) by (i i i).
Conversely, if B ∈ E(S) for some B ∈ P0(A) and S ∈ P0(N ), then A\B /∈ E(N\S)
by (i i i). Let B ′ ∈ E(N\S), then B ′  A\B by monotonicity, so that B ∩ B ′ = ∅. So
B ∈ E∗(S). unionsq
Remark 2.2 Note that, in the proof of Proposition 2.1, monotonicity of E is only used
to prove that E(S) ⊆ E∗(S) for all S ∈ P(N ) in the last part of the proof. This would
also follow directly from superadditivity of E . Hence, Proposition 2.1 also holds with
superadditivity instead of monotonicity.
The following result will be useful in the sequel.
Proposition 2.3 Let E be a maximal effectivity function. Then for each minimal B ∈
E(S) and alternative a ∈ B, there is a minimal B ′ ∈ E(N\S) such that B ∩ B ′ = {a}.
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Proof Let S ∈ P0(N ), B ∈ E(S), and a ∈ B. By superadditivity, B ∩ B ′ = ∅ for
all B ′ ∈ E(N\S). Suppose that for each minimal B ′ ∈ E(N\S) there is some b = a
such that b ∈ B ∩ B ′. Then (B\{a}) ∩ B ′ = ∅ for all minimal B ′ ∈ E(N\S), hence
for all B ′ ∈ E(N\S). Thus, B\{a} ∈ E∗(S) = E(S). So B is not minimal in E(S).
unionsq
A game form is an (n+2)-tuple = (1, . . . , n;π; A), where (i)i is the (non-
empty, finite) set of possible actions1 of player i ∈ N ; and (ii) π : 1×· · ·×n → A
is the outcome function. Throughout the paper we assume that π is surjective. For
S ∈ P0(N ) we denote S = ∏i∈S i .
Let  = (1, . . . , n;π; A) be a game form. For S ∈ P0(N ) and σ S ∈ S ,
we define B(σ S) = {π(σ S, σ N\S) | σ N\S ∈ N\S}. The effectivity function E ,
associated with , is defined in the following way: E(∅) = ∅ and for S ∈ P0(N ),
E(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | B(σ S) ⊆ B for some σ S ∈ S}.
Note that E is monotonic and superadditive. Let E : P(N ) → P(P0(A)) be an
effectivity function. A game form  is a representation of E if E(S) = E(S) for
every S ∈ P0(N ). Basically, this means that the game form distributes the same power
among the players as the effectivity function does.
Remark 2.4 If B ∈ P0(A) is a minimal set of coalition S ∈ P0(N ) in E(S), then
there exists an action profile σ S ∈ S such that B(σ S) = B.
An information structure is an n-tuple T = (T 1, . . . , T n), where T i is the finite set
of types of player i = 1, . . . , n. We denote by T N = ∏i∈N T i the set of type profiles.
With some abuse of notation we denote by WT the set of all preference ordering
profiles: a profile RT ∈ WT has dimension ∑i∈N |T i | and assigns a preference
ordering to each type of each player.We assume that preferences are private valued, i.e.,
they do not depend on types of the other players. If = (1, . . . , n;π; A) is a game
form, then (, T, RT ) is a game of incomplete information in the sense of Harsanyi
(1967). The set of strategies of player i in this game is the set Si = {si | si : T i → i }.
We denote SN = ∏i∈N Si . We do not introduce type probabilities since we will only
consider ex post Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ SN is an ex
post (Nash) equilibrium (EPE) of (, T, RT ) if for all i ∈ N , all t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈
T N and all σ i ∈ i ,
π(s(t))Rt
i
π(s−i (t−i ), σ i ),
where s−i (t−i ) is the vector (s j (t j )) j =i . Let s ∈ SN be an EPE, then we call π(s(t))
the Nash outcome for t ∈ T N . Game form  is ex post (Nash) consistent for T
if (, T, RT ) has an EPE for every RT ∈ WT . If T is an arbitrary collection of
information structures – that is, with possibly different type set cardinalities – then we
say that game form  is ex post (Nash) consistent for T if (, T, RT ) has an EPE for
every T ∈ T and every RT ∈ WT . Specifically, if T = {T } with |T i | = 1 for every
1 We reserve the term ‘strategy’ for game forms with incomplete information later on.
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i ∈ N , then an ex post consistent game form  is Nash consistent (cf. Peleg et al.
2002). We say that effectivity function E has an ex post consistent representation for
a collection T of information structures if there exists a game form  such that  is
a representation of E and  is ex post consistent for T . We say that E has an ex post
consistent representation if there exists a game form  such that  represents E and
 is ex post consistent for every information structure T .
Lemma 2.5 Suppose s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ SN is an EPE of (, T, RT ). Then
B(s−i (t−i )) ⊆ L(π(s(t)), Rti ) for all t ∈ T N .
Proof Let t ∈ T N . Let a ∈ B(s−i (t−i )). Then there is σ i ∈ i such that




Remark 2.6 If s ∈ SN is an EPE of (, T, RT ), then Lemma 2.5 and monotonicity
imply L(π(s(t)), Rt
i
) ∈ E(N\{i}) for every i ∈ N and every t i ∈ T i .
Notation In the sequel, instead of E({i}), we usually write E(i).
3 A representing game form
In this section we present the basic game form which is used throughout the paper. We
focus on this particular game form as it is one of the simplest game forms that yields the
desired results. Later, we will extend and modify this game form to obtain our main
results. Alternative representing game forms can be found in many places, notably
Peleg (1998), Peleg et al. (2002), Peleg and Peters (2010), and Boros et al. (2010).
Let E be a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function. We fix a numbering
of the alternatives in A, say A = {a1, . . . , a|A|}. For i ∈ N let Fi = {(S, B) | i ∈ S ⊆
N and B ∈ E(S)}. We define the game form G0 = (1, . . . , n;π; A) as follows.
The set of actions of i ∈ N is the set i = {( f, k) | f ∈ Fi and k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}}.
The idea is that if B ∈ E(S) and f i = (S, B) for all i ∈ S, then the outcome is
guaranteed to be within B. The integer k is to make sure that every i ∈ S can cause
every a ∈ B to be the outcome.
Let σ = (σ 1, . . . , σ n) ∈ N = ∏i∈N i , where σ i = ( f i , ki ) ∈ i for i ∈ N .
We say that coalition S ∈ P0(N ) is formed if there is B ∈ E(S) such that f i =
(S, B) for all i ∈ S. Define D ∈ P0(A) as follows. If no coalition is formed, then
D = A. Otherwise, let {S1, . . . , Sr } be the collection of formed coalitions. For each
j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, there is Bj ∈ E(S j ) such that f i = (S j , Bj ) for all i ∈ S j . Then let
D = ⋂rj=1 Bj . Note that D = ∅ because E is superadditive and formed coalitions
are pairwise disjoint. Suppose D = {a j1, . . . , a j|D| } with j1 < . . . < j|D|. We define
π(σ) = a jp , where p =
∑
i∈N
ki (mod |D|)+ 1. Thus, given D, every player can cause
any a ∈ D to be the outcome by choosing ki accordingly.
Proposition 3.1 G0 is a representation of E.
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Proof We first show that E(S) ⊆ EG0(S) for all S ∈ P0(N ). Let S ∈ P0(N ) and
B ∈ E(S). Choose σ i = ((S, B), 1) for all i ∈ S. Then the coalition S is formed and
hence by definition of π , π(σ S, τ N\S) ∈ B for all τ N\S ∈ N\S . So, B(σ S) ⊆ B.
In order to prove the converse inclusion, let S ∈ P0(N ) and B ∈ EG0(S). Since
E(N ) = P0(A) and A ∈ E(S) for all S ∈ P0(N ), we can assume that S = N and
B = A. We show that B ∈ E(S). Let σ S ∈ S be such that B(σ S) ⊆ B and for each
i ∈ N\S choose τ i such that f i = (N\S, A). Consider the action profile (σ S, τ N\S).
In this profile, since B = A, S contains at least one formed coalition. Let {S1, . . . , Sr }
denote the set of all formed coalitions within S; hence, for each j = 1, . . . , r and
i ∈ S j , σ i = ( f i , ki )with f i = (S j , Bj ) for some Bj ∈ E(S j ). Thus, for (σ S, τ N\S),
the set of formed coalitions is {S1, . . . , Sr , N\⋃rj=1 S j }. Since Bj ∈ E(S j ) for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, and⋃rj=1 S j ⊆ S, superadditivity andmonotonicity imply
⋂
j∈J B j ∈
E(S). It remains to show that
⋂
j∈J B j ⊆ B(σ S), since then monotonicity implies
that B ∈ E(S).
Take a ∈ ⋂ j∈J B j . Since S = N , given
∑
i∈S ki , N\S is able to choose
∑
i∈N\S ki
such that π(σ S, τ N\S) = a. Hence a ∈ B(σ S) for every a ∈ ⋂ j∈J B j , which
completes the proof. unionsq
4 Two-person effectivity functions
Throughout this section we assume that N = {1, 2}. The following result is from Peleg
et al. (2002), see Remark 3.13 in the paper.
Lemma 4.1 Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function. The follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
(i) E has a Nash consistent representation.
(ii) E is maximal.
The original condition for the existence of aNash consistent representation is condition
(ii) in Lemma 5.1 below. However, for two players, it follows as a corollary from
superadditivity and condition (ii) in Lemma 5.1 that E must be maximal.
4.1 One-sided incomplete information
In this subsection, we consider the case of one-sided incomplete information. Without
loss of generality, we assume that |T 1| ≥ 1 and |T 2| = 1. This means that the
preference ordering of one player is commonly known, while the other player possibly
has multiple types.
The main theorem of this subsection shows that in case of one-sided incomplete
information, ex post consistent representation imposes no further conditions on the
effectivity function compared to Nash consistent representation.
Theorem 4.2 Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function. Let T =
{(T 1, T 2) | |T 1| ≥ 1 and |T 2| = 1}. The following statements are equivalent:
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(i) E has a Nash consistent representation.
(ii) E has an ex post consistent representation for T .
Proof To prove the implication (i) ⇒ (i i), suppose E has a Nash consistent represen-
tation, and let T ∈ T . Then by Lemma 4.1 E is maximal.We consider the representing
game form G0 from Sect. 3 and show that this game form always contains an EPE.
Let R2 ∈ W be the preference ordering of player 2, and write a1R2 . . . R2am , where
m = |A|. Let j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that L(a j , R2) ∈ E(1) and L(a j+1, R2) /∈ E(1)
(where we define L(am+1, R2) = ∅). Define B2 = {a1, . . . , a j }. By Proposi-
tion 2.1 (iii), B2 ∈ E(2). Consider the strategy profile where player 2 plays
σ 2 = (({2}, B2), 1), and every type t1 ∈ T 1 plays σ 1 = (({1}, L(a, R2)), k), with
a ∈ B2 such that aRt1b for all b ∈ B2 and with k such that π(σ 1, σ 2) = a. It is
straightforward to check that this strategy profile is an EPE.
To prove the implication (i i) ⇒ (i), suppose E has an ex post consistent represen-
tation  for T . In particular, the game form  has an ex post equilibrium if all types
of player 1 have the same preference ordering. This is equivalent to saying that E has
a Nash consistent representation. unionsq
4.2 Two-sided incomplete information
In this subsection, still for two players, we consider the case of two-sided incomplete
information.
A player i ∈ N is a singleton player if all minimal sets of player i in E(i) are
singletons.
Example 4.3 Let A = {a, b} with a = b. There are two possible maximal effectivity
functions (if we omit effectivity functions obtainable from these two by permutations
of players or alternatives):
(i) E(1) = E({1, 2}) = {{a}, {b}, A} and E(2) = {A}
(ii) E(1) = E(2) = {{a}, A} and E({1, 2}) = {{a}, {b}, A}
Note that in (i) player 1 is a ‘dictator’. Also, both effectivity functions contain a
singleton player.
The following theorem characterizes all two-player effectivity functions with an
ex post consistent representation for all information structures in which both players
have at least two types. In fact, its proof shows that if there exists an ex post consistent
representation of E , then any representation is ex post consistent.
Theorem 4.4 Let E be a maximal effectivity function. Let T = {(T 1, T 2) |
|T 1|, |T 2| ≥ 2}. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) E has an ex post consistent representation for T .
(ii) E contains a singleton player.
Proof To prove the implication (i) ⇒ (i i), suppose E does not contain a singleton
player. We will present a preference profile for T ∈ T with |T 1| = |T 2| = 2 such that
no EPE exists in any representing game form.
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Let B1 beminimal for player 1with |B1| ≥ 2 and let B2 beminimal for player 2with
|B2| ≥ 2 (these sets exist, since there is no singleton player). Take a ∈ B1 ∩ B2 = ∅
(this is possible by superadditivity), and b ∈ B1 with b = a (this is possible since
|B1| ≥ 2). We can assume that |A| ≥ 3, because if |A| = 2 then every maximal effec-



















B1\{a, b} B1\{a, b}
Now let  be a representing game form and suppose that (s1, s2) is an EPE in the
game with this preference profile. We derive a contradiction.
(a) Claim b ∈ B(s2(t2,1)).
Proof of claim: Since B1\{b} /∈ E(1) (B1 is minimal for player 1),
Remark 2.6 implies π(s1(t1,1), s2(t2,1)) /∈ B1\{b}. Since A\B1 /∈ E(2)
(by superadditivity), Remark 2.6 implies π(s1(t1,1), s2(t2,1)) /∈ A\B1. Hence
π(s1(t1,1), s2(t2,1)) = b, which implies that b ∈ B(s2(t2,1)).
(b) Claim B(s1(t1,2)) = B1.
Proof of claim: Since b ∈ B(s2(t2,1)) by the previous claim, and b is t1,2’s most
preferred element, π(s1(t1,2), s2(t2,1)) = b. This implies, by Lemma 2.5 and
minimality of B1, that B(s1(t1,2)) = B1.
Now, since B(s1(t1,2)) = B1 and a is t2,2 ’s most preferred alternative from B1,
π(s1(t1,2), s2(t2,2)) = a. Hence, by Remark 2.6, {a} = L(π(s1(t1,2), s2(t2,2)),
Rt
1,2
) ∈ E(2). Since a ∈ B2, this contradicts minimality of B2.
In order to prove the implication (i i) ⇒ (i), assume that E contains a singleton
player, and let T ∈ T . We show that for any representing game form  and any
RT ∈ WT , the game (, T, RT ) has an EPE. Without loss of generality assume that
player 1 is a singleton player. Let B2 = {a ∈ A | {a} is a minimal set for player 1}.
By Proposition 2.1 (ii), we have B2 ∈ E(2). Consider the strategy profile in which
every type t1 ∈ T 1 plays an action σ 1 ∈ 1 such that B(σ 1) = {a} for a ∈ B2 such
that aRt
1
b for all b ∈ B2; and in which every type t2 ∈ T 2 plays an action σ 2 ∈ 2
such that B(σ 2) = B2. It is easy to see that this strategy profile is an EPE. unionsq
5 More than two players
Throughout this section, unless stated otherwise, we assume that |N | ≥ 3. The fol-
lowing result is from Peleg et al. (2002), in particular Remark 3.11 there.
Lemma 5.1 Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function. The follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
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(i) E has a Nash consistent representation.
(i) Bi /∈ E(N\{i}) for all i ∈ N ⇒ A\⋃ni=1 Bi = ∅.
In order to see that condition (ii) is a necessary condition, suppose that the condition
does not hold true, i.e., there are Bi /∈ E(N\{i}) for all i ∈ N such that⋃ni=1 Bi = A.
If each player i ∈ N prefers the alternatives in the complement of Bi to the alternatives
in Bi , then there is no Nash alternative (observe that each alternative is in some Bi
and since Bi /∈ E(N\{i}), player i has a profitable deviation).
5.1 Incomplete information
In this subsection, we consider the case of incomplete information. Our main result is
the characterization of effectivity functions that have an ex post consistent represen-
tation for any number of types. The next theorem extends Theorem 4.4 to n > 2. The
game form that we introduce consists of two parts: actions that assure representation
(as in G0), and equilibrium actions.
The idea behind condition (ii) is that in an ex post Nash equilibrium, player i is
restricted to choose his most preferred alternative from C and no other player is able
to change the outcome by unilateral deviation. So each such C is a set of possible
equilibrium outcomes. For an illustration, see Example 5.6.
Theorem 5.2 Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function. The fol-
lowing statements are equivalent:
(i) E has an ex post consistent representation.
(ii) There exists an i ∈ N and C ∈ E(N\{i}) such that {a} ∈ E(N\{ j}) for all a ∈ C
and for every j = i .
Proof We first prove the implication (i) ⇒ (i i). We assume that for every i ∈ N and
every Bi ∈ E(N\{i}), there is a ∈ Bi such that {a} /∈ E(N\{ j}) for some j = i .
First, we define a specific preference profile. Second, we show that for this particular
preference profile no EPE exists in any representing game form.
We define the sets A1,i = {a ∈ A | {a} /∈ E(N\{i}) and {a} ∈ E(N\{ j}) for all
j = i} for all i ∈ N , and A2 = {a ∈ A | there are i, j ∈ N , with i =
j , such that {a} /∈ E(N\{i}) and {a} /∈ E(N\{ j})}. By our assumption, ⋃ni=1 A1,i ∪
A2 = A. Moreover, A1,i ∩ A2 = ∅ for all i ∈ N and A1,i ∩ A1, j = ∅ for all i = j .
The definition of the announced preference profile will be given by an algorithm,
as follows. We start with an information structure (T 1, . . . , T n) such that |T i | = 1 for
all i ∈ N . Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T 1 ×· · ·×T n denote the corresponding type vector.
In the algorithm, for every i ∈ N , two sets Hi ⊆ A and Li ⊆ A are defined, and a
preference ordering Rt
i
over Hi ∪ Li such that for all a ∈ Hi and all b ∈ Li , aPti b
(alternatives in Hi are strictly preferred to alternatives in Li ). We iteratively extend
this preference ordering by adding an a ∈ A to either Hi or Li for every i ∈ N , until
Hi ∪ Li = A. Under a specific condition, extra types may be added. See Algorithm
1.2
2 See Example 5.5 for an illustration of this algorithm. The constructed preference profile can also be
defined directly, but the description via the algorithm is more transparent.
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Algorithm 1 Construction of a preference profile
for i := 1, . . . , n do
while A1,i = ∅ do
Take a ∈ A1,i ;
Li := Li ∪ {a} such that aPti b for all b ∈ Li ;




while A2 = ∅ do
Take a ∈ A2;
Take i, j ∈ N , with i = j , such that {a} /∈ E(N\{i}) and {a} /∈ E(N\{ j});
Li := Li ∪ {a} such that aPti b for all b ∈ Li ;
For all k = i , Hk := Hk ∪ {a} such that bPtk a for all b ∈ Hk ;
if L(a, Rt
k
) ∈ E(N\{k}) for all k ∈ N then
T i := T i ∪ t ′i and T j := T j ∪ t ′ j , where
Rt
′i












Consider the constructed preference profile RT with associated information struc-
ture T and let  be a representing game form. Suppose that (s1, . . . , sn) is an EPE in
(, T, RT ). We derive a contradiction.
Let i ∈ N . Since for all a ∈ A1,i , {a} ∈ E(N\{ j}) for all j = i , our initial
assumption implies A1,i /∈ E(N\{i}). Thus, for all i ∈ N and for all a ∈ A1,i , we
have L(a, Rt
i
) /∈ E(N\{i}). Hence, by Remark 2.6, we have π(s(t)) /∈ ⋃ni=1 A1,i
and thus π(s(t)) ∈ A2 with L(π(s(t)), Rti ) ∈ E(N\{i}) for all i ∈ N .
Let a = π(s(t)). If no new types were added in the algorithm, then there was a
player k ∈ N such that L(a, Rtk ) = L(π(s(t)), Rtk ) /∈ E(N\{k}), but this contradicts
Remark 2.6. So we may assume that there are i, j ∈ N , with i = j , be such that t ′i
and t ′ j are added for a. In the step of the algorithm where t ′i and t ′ j are added, a
becomes the most preferred element of Li for t i and the least preferred element of
Hj for t j . Since each remaining alternative b ∈ A2\{a} becomes either the new best





b for all remaining b ∈ A2\{a}. So in fact, the preference

















On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation... 299
Observe the following:
(a) Lemma 2.5 implies that B(s−i (t−i )) ⊆ L(a, Rti ). Since L(a, Rti ) ∈ E(N\{i})
by the condition for adding types t ′i and t ′ j in the algorithm, and {a} /∈
E(N\{i}) since a ∈ A2, we have L(a, Rti )\{a} = ∅. Since a is t ′i ’s least pre-
ferred element, we have π(s−i (t−i ), si (t ′i )) ∈ L(a, Rti )\{a}. But this implies
that π(s−i, j (t−i, j ), si (t ′i ), s j (t ′ j )) = a and π(s−i, j (t−i, j ), si (t ′i ), s j (t ′ j )) /∈
A\L(a, Rti ).3
(b) Lemma 2.5 implies that B(s− j (t− j )) ⊆ L(a, Rt j ). Similarly as in (a), we
have L(a, Rt
j
)\{a} = ∅. Since a is t ′ j ’s least preferred element, we have
π(s− j (t− j ), s j (t ′ j )) ∈ L(a, Rt j )\{a}. But this implies thatπ(s−i, j (t−i, j ), si (t ′i ),
s j (t ′ j )) /∈ A\L(a, Rt j ).
If we show that {a}∪ A\L(a, Rti )∪ A\L(a, Rt j ) = A, then we have proved that there
is no Nash outcome for (t−i, j , t ′i , t ′ j ), which is in contradiction with the assumption
that (s1, . . . , sn) is an EPE. Note that it is sufficient to show that L(a, Rt
i
)\{a} ⊆
A\L(a, Rt j ).
Take b ∈ L(a, Rti ), with b = a. Since aPti b, in the algorithm b became the new
best element of Li for t i before a became the new best element of Li for t i . So also,
b became the new worst element of Hj for t j before a became the new worst element
of Hj for t j . Hence bPt
j
a and thus b ∈ A\L(a, Rt j ). This concludes the proof of the
implication (i) ⇒ (i i).
We now prove the implication (i i) ⇒ (i). We assume that there exists an i ∈ N
and C ∈ E(N\{i}) such that {a} ∈ E(N\{ j}) for all a ∈ C and for every j = i .
W.l.o.g. assume i = 1. We write C = {a1, . . . , a|C|}.
We extend G0 = (1, . . . , n;π; A) from Sect. 3 to a game form G1 =
(11 , . . . , 
n
1 ;π1; A) as follows.The set of actions of i ∈ N is the seti1 = {( f, k)| f ∈
Fi ∪ {v} and k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}}.
Let σ = (σ 1, . . . , σ n) ∈ N1 , where σ i = ( f i , ki ) ∈ i1 for every i ∈ N . Define
K = {i ∈ N | f i ∈ Fi } and L = {i ∈ N | f i = v}. Then N = K ∪ L and K ∩ L = ∅.
To define π1(σ ), we distinguish two cases:
(i) |L| < n − 1. Then π1(σ ) = π(σ), with π the outcome function of G0 (see
Sect. 3).
(ii) |L| ≥ n − 1. Then π1(σ ) = ap ∈ C , where p = k1 (mod |C |) + 1.
Claim G1 is a representation of E .
To prove this claim we first show that E(S) ⊆ EG1(S) for all S ∈ P0(N ). Let
S ∈ P0(N ) and B ∈ E(S). We distinguish three cases
• |S| ≥ 2. Choose σ i = ((S, B), 1) for all i ∈ S. Then coalition S is formed
and hence by definition of π1, π1(σ S, τ N\S) ∈ B for all τ N\S ∈ N\S1 . So,
B(σ S) ⊆ B.
• S = {1}. Choose σ 1 = (({1}, B), k1), where k1 is defined as follows. Since
C ∈ E(N\{1}), superadditivity implies that A\C /∈ E(1) and thus B ∩ C = ∅.
3 We define s−i, j (t−i, j ) as the vector (sk (tk ))k =i, j .
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This implies that we can choose k1 such that π1(σ 1, τ N\{1}) ∈ B if τ N\{1} is such
that f j = v for all j ∈ N\{1}. For all other τ N\{1} ∈ N\{1}1 , it is sufficient to
note that coalition {1} forms.
• S = {i}, with i = 1. Choose σ i = (({i}, B), 1). Since {a} ∈ E(N\{i}) for all a ∈
C , superadditivity implies that B ⊇ C . Thus, by definition of π1, π1(σ i , τ N\{i}) ∈
B for all τ N\{i} ∈ N\{i}1 .
In order to prove the converse inclusion, let S ∈ P0(N ) and B ∈ EG1(S). We
show that B ∈ E(S). Let σ S ∈ S such that B(σ S) ⊆ B. We only treat the case
where |S| = n − 1 and σ S is such that f i = v for all i ∈ S. For all other cases, it
is sufficient to note that G1 is an extension of G0. We distinguish two cases.
• 1 /∈ S. Then, by construction of the game form, B(σ S) = C . By assumption,
C ∈ E(N\{1}) = E(S) and thus by monotonicity B ∈ E(S).
• 1 ∈ S and j /∈ S. Then by construction B(σ S) = {a} for some a ∈ C . By
assumption, {a} ∈ E(N\{ j}) = E(S), and thus by monotonicity B ∈ E(S).
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Now let T be an arbitrary information structure. It remains to prove that G1 is ex
post consistent for T . Let RT ∈ WT . Consider the following strategy profile s ∈ SN .
For every t i ∈ T i , with i = 1, s(t i ) = (v, 1). For every t1 ∈ T 1, s(t1) = (v, k1) such
that k1 selects alternative a ∈ C , where aRt1b for all b ∈ C .
If t1 ∈ T 1 deviates, t1 is able to choose an alternative from C . Since aRt1b for all
b ∈ C , t1 is not able to improve. If t i ∈ T i , with i = 1, deviates, the outcome does
not change. Hence this profile is an EPE. unionsq
Remark 5.3 It is not difficult to verify that condition (ii) of Theorem 5.2 implies
condition (ii) of Lemma 5.1.
Corollary 5.4 Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function with a
Nash consistent representation. If E(N\{i}) = {A} for some i ∈ N, then E has an ex
post consistent representation.
Proof If E(N\{i}) = {A} for some i ∈ N , then Lemma 5.1 (ii) implies that
E(N\{ j}) = P0(A) for all j = i . By Theorem 5.2, E has an ex post consistent
representation. unionsq
The next example illustrates the construction of a preference profile without an ex
post Nash consistent representation in the proof of Theorem 5.2.
Example 5.5 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c, d, e}. Let E be a superadditive and
monotonic effectivity function with
E({1, 2}) = {{c}, {d}, {e}, {a, b}}+
E({1, 3}) = {{a}, {b}, {e}, {c, d}}+
E({2, 3}) = {{a}, {c}, {b, d}, {b, e}, {d, e}}+ .
(The superscript + indicates that all supersets are included as well.) We illustrate
the procedure of Algorithm 1. We have A1,1 = {e}, A1,2 = {c}, A1,3 = {a} and
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This is the profile, used in the proof of Theorem 5.2, for which there is no ex post
Nash equilibrium. However, in this example there is another preference profile with
less types for which also no representing game form with an EPE exists. This can be




























Thus, the algorithm used in the proof of Theorem 5.2 is not always the most efficient
one in terms of the number of types needed in order to obtain nonexistence of an ex
post Nash equilibrium.
The following example displays an effectivity function with an ex post Nash con-
sistent representation.
Example 5.6 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c}. Consider the following
effectivity function: E(1) = E(2) = {{a, b}, A}, E(3) = {A}, E({1, 2}) =
{{a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}}+ and E({1, 3}) = E({2, 3}) = {{a}, {b}}+. By Theorem 5.2,
this effectivity function has an ex post consistent representation. Consider the follow-
ing representation:
M1 L M R
T a a a
C a b c
B a c b
M2 L M R
T b b b
C b c a
B b a c
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in which 1 = {T,C, B}, 2 = {L , M, R} and 3 = {M1, M2}. This representation
is ex post consistent for any T . Namely, the following strategy profile always consti-
tutes an EPE: all t1 ∈ T 1 play T , all t2 ∈ T 2 play L and all t3 ∈ T 3 with aRt3b
play M1 and all t3 ∈ T 3 with bPt3a play M2. Observe that E has no ‘dictator’ (i.e., a
player who is effective for every singleton. In the given equilibrium, however, player
3 can act as if he is the dictator over {a, b}.
5.2 Discussion
Theorem 5.2 characterizes all effectivity functions for which no ex post consistent rep-
resentation exists, i.e., there is no game form that represents the effectivity function and
that has an ex post Nash equilibrium for any information structure T = (T 1, . . . , T n)
and any profile of preferences for all types. Although it is not difficult to derive an
upper bound on the number of types needed such that no ex post consistent represen-
tation exists (e.g., by considering Algorithm 1), it is less obvious how to derive a sharp
upper bound (depending on the effectivity function at hand).
As a first partial answer, Proposition 5.7 extends Theorem 4.2 to n > 2. Its (more
involved) proof is delegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 5.7 Let E be a superadditive and monotonic effectivity function. Let
T = {(T 1, . . . , T n) | |T 1| ≥ 2 and |T i | = 1 for all i = 1}. The following statements
are equivalent:
(i) E has a Nash consistent representation.
(i) E has an ex post consistent representation for T .
As a second partial answer, we present an example of an effectivity function that
has no ex post consistent representation for any number of types, but has one if we
restrict to two types per player.
Example 5.8 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c, d, e}. Let E be a superadditive and
monotonic effectivity function with E({1, 2}) = P0(A) and E({1, 3}) = E({2, 3}) =
{{x, y} | x, y ∈ A, x = y}. By Theorem 5.2, E has no ex post consistent represen-
tation. Let T be an information structure with |Ti | = 2 for i = 1, 2, 3. Then E has
an ex post consistent representation for T . Such a representation is constructed in the
Appendix.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5.7 To prove the implication (i) ⇒ (i i), assume that E has a
Nash consistent representation, and let T ∈ T . By Lemma 5.1, if Bi /∈ E(N\{i}) for
all i ∈ N then A\⋃ni=1 Bi = ∅.
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We extend G0 = (1, . . . , n;π; A) from Sect. 3 to a game form G2 =
(12 , . . . , 
n
2 ;π2; A), as follows. A selection is a function φ:P0(A) → A such that
φ(B) ∈ B for every B ∈ P0(A). Denote by the set of all selections. The set of actions
of i ∈ N is the set i2 = {( f, k, φ) | f ∈ Fi ∪W N\{1} , k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|} and φ ∈ }.
Let σ = (σ 1, . . . , σ n) ∈ N2 , where σ i = ( f i , ki , φi ) ∈ i2 for every i ∈ N .
Define K = {i ∈ N | f i ∈ Fi } and LRN\{1}={i ∈ N | f i = RN\{1}} for all
RN\{1} ∈ W N\{1}. Note that every i ∈ N is either in K or in LRN\{1} for some
RN\{1} ∈ W N\{1}. In order to define π2(σ ), we consider two cases.
(i) If |LRN\{1} | < n −1 for all RN\{1} ∈ W N\{1}, then we define π2(σ ) = π(σ), with
π as in G0 (Sect. 3).
(ii) Suppose |LRN\{1} | ≥ n − 1 for some RN\{1} ∈ W N\{1}. For every i = 1, we
define Bi /∈ E(N\{i}) as follows. Let Ri be the preference ordering of player i
in the profile RN\{1}, say a1Ri . . . Riam , where m = |A|. Choose j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
such that L(a j , Ri ) ∈ E(N\{i}) and L(a j+1, Ri ) /∈ E(N\{i}) (where we define
L(am+1, Ri ) = ∅). Then we define Bi = L(a j+1, Ri ). Since Bi /∈ E(N\{i}) for
all i = 1,we have A\⋃i =1 Bi = ∅. This implies thatCRN\{1} ∈ E(N\{1}), where
CR
N\{1} = A\⋃i =1 Bi . To define π2(σ ), we distinguish two further subcases:
(ii.a) If LR
N\{1} = N\{i}with i = 1, thenwe define a = φ1(CRN\{1}), andπ2(σ ) =
φi (L(a, Ri )).
(ii.b) If LR
N\{1} = N\{1} or LRN\{1} = N , then we define π2(σ ) = φ1(CRN\{1}).
Claim G2 is a representation of E .
To prove this claim, we first show that E(S) ⊆ EG2(S) for all S ∈ P0(N ). Let
S ∈ P0(N ) and B ∈ E(S). We distinguish three cases.
• |S| ≥ 2. Choose σ i = ((S, B), 1, φi ), with φi chosen arbitrarily, for all i ∈ S.
Then the coalition S is formed and hence by definition of π2, π2(σ S, τ N\S) =
π(σ S, τ N\S) ∈ B for all τ N\S ∈ N\S2 . So, B(σ S) ⊆ B.• S = {1}. Choose σ 1 = (({1}, B), 1, φ1), where φ1 is such that φ1(B ′) ∈ B for all
B ′ with B ′ ∩ B = ∅.
If τ N\{1} is such that f j = RN\{1} for all j ∈ N\{1}, we haveCRN\{1} ∈ E(N\{1})
and thus by superadditivity A\CRN\{1} /∈ E(1). Hence, by monotonicity, B ∩
CR
N\{1} = ∅, which means that φ1 selects an alternative from B.
For all other τ N\{1} ∈ N\{1}1 , coalition {1} forms. Thus, by definition of π2,
π2(σ
1, τ N\{1}) = π(σ 1, τ N\{1}) ∈ B for all τ N\{1} ∈ N\{1}2 .• S = {i}, with i = 1. Choose σ i = (({i}, B), 1, φi ), where φi is such that φi (B ′) ∈
B for all B ′ with B ′ ∩ B = ∅.
If τ N\{i} is such that f j = RN\{1} for all j ∈ N\{i}, the definition of CRN\{1}
implies L(a, Ri ) ∈ E(N\{i}) for all a ∈ CRN\{1} . Then superadditivity implies that
A\L(a, Ri ) /∈ E(i). Hence B ∩ L(a, Ri ) = ∅ for all a ∈ CRN\{1} , which means that
φi selects an alternative from B.
For all other τ N\{i} ∈ N\{i}2 , coalition {i} forms. Thus, by definition of π2,
π2(σ
i , τ N\{i}) = π(σ i , τ N\{i}) ∈ B for all τ N\{i} ∈ N\{i}2 .
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In order to prove the converse inclusion, let S ∈ P0(N ) and B ∈ EG2(S). Since
E(N ) = P0(A) and A ∈ E(S) for all S ∈ P0(N ), we can assume that S = N and
B = A. We show that B ∈ E(S). Let σ S ∈ S be such that B(σ S) ⊆ B. We only treat
the case where |S| = n−1 and σ S is such that f i = RN\{1} for some RN\{1} ∈ W N\{1}
and for all i ∈ S. For all other cases, it is sufficient to note that G2 is an extension of
G0. We distinguish two subcases.
• 1 /∈ S. Then, by construction of the game form, B(σ S) = CRN\{1} . By definition
of CR
N\{1}
, we have CR
N\{1} ∈ E(N\{1}) = E(S) and thus by monotonicity
B ∈ E(S).
• 1 ∈ S and j /∈ S. Then by construction B(σ S) = L(a, R j ) for some a ∈ CRN\{1} .
By definition of CR
N\{1}
and since j = 1, we have L(a, R j ) ∈ E(N\{ j}) = E(S)
for all a ∈ CRN\{1} and thus, by monotonicity, B ∈ E(S).
This concludes the proof of the Claim.
We now prove that G2 is ex post consistent for T . Let RT ∈ WT . Consider the
following strategy profile s ∈ SN . For every t i ∈ T i with i = 1, s(t i ) = (RT−1 , 1, φi ),
with φi chosen arbitrarily. For every t1 ∈ T 1, s(t1) = (RT−1 , 1, φ1) is such that φ1
selects alternative a ∈ CRN\{1} , where aRt1b for all b ∈ CRN\{1} .
If t1 ∈ T 1 deviates, t1 is able to choose an alternative from CRN\{1} . Since for
a ∈ CRN\{1} wehaveaRt1b for allb ∈ CRN\{1} , t1 is not able to improve. If t i ∈ T i , with
i = 1, deviates, t i is able to choose from L(a, Rti ). Since aRti b for all b ∈ L(a, Rti ),
t i is not able to improve. Hence this profile is an EPE.
For the implication (i i) ⇒ (i), assume that E has an ex post consistent represen-
tation  for T . In particular, the game form  should contain an ex post equilibrium
if all types of player 1 have the same preference ordering. This is equivalent to saying
that E has a Nash consistent representation. unionsq
Construction of the representation in Example 5.8 The construction proceeds in sev-
eral steps.





3;π3; A), as follows. Let T˜ = (T 1, T 2). The set of actions of i ∈ N is the
set i3 = {( f, r, k, φ) | f ∈ Fi ∪ WT˜ , r ∈ T i , k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|} and φ ∈ }. Here,
 is the set of all selections, as in the game form G2 in the proof of Proposition 5.7.
Let σ = (σ 1, σ 2, σ 3) ∈ N3 , where σ i = ( f i , r i , ki , φi ) ∈ i3 for i ∈ N . Define
K = {i ∈ N | f i ∈ Fi } and LRT˜ = {i ∈ N | f i = RT˜ } for all RT˜ ∈ WT˜ . Note that
every i ∈ N is either in K or in LRT˜ for some RT˜ ∈ WT˜ . We define π3(σ ) as follows.
• If |LRT˜ | < 2 for all RT˜ ∈ WT˜ , then π3(σ ) = π(σ) with π as in G0 (see Sect. 3).
• If |LRT˜ | ≥ 2 for some RT˜ ∈ WT˜ , then we distinguish two cases. Assume without
loss of generality that Rt
1,1
orders the elements of A as abcde.
(i) There are x, y, z ∈ A, with x = y, x = z and y = z, such that x Rt1,1 z and
yRt
1,1




z. Then we define
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x if [LRT˜ = {1, 2} or LRT˜ = N ] and x Rr2 y.
y if [LRT˜ = {1, 2} or LRT˜ = N ] and yPr2x .
φ2({x, y}) if LRT˜ = {1, 3}.
φ1({x, z}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3} and x Rr2 y.
φ1({y, z}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3} and yPr2 z.











T˜ ∈ {{1, 2}, N }, r1 = t1,1, and x Rr2 y.
y if LR
T˜ ∈ {{1, 2}, N }, r1 = t1,1, and yPr2x .
d if LR
T˜ ∈ {{1, 2}, N }, r1 = t1,2, and dRr2e.
e if LR
T˜ ∈ {{1, 2}, N }, r1 = t1,2, and ePr2d.
φ2({x, y}) if LRT˜ = {1, 3} and r1 = t1,1.
φ2({d, e}) if LRT˜ = {1, 3} and r1 = t1,2.
φ1({x, d}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3}, x Rr2 y, and dRr2e.
φ1({x, e}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3}, x Rr2 y, and ePr2d.
φ1({y, d}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3}, yPr2x, and dRr2e.
φ1({y, e}) if LRT˜ = {2, 3}, yPr2x, and ePr2d.
We now show that the game form G3 is properly defined, in particular, that the cases
(i) and (ii) cover all preference orderings. Suppose we are not in case (i). Then there





z. For z = e, this implies that there is at most one alternative
preferred to e for t1,2.
If dRt
1,2













c. Hence we are in case (ii).
If ePt
1,2
d, then for z = d, the supposition that we are not in case (i) implies
that there is at most one alternative from {a, b, c} preferred to d for t1,2. This means
there are at least two alternatives from {a, b, c} to which d is strictly preferred. By
transitivity, e is also strictly preferred to these two alternatives and hence we are in
case (ii).
Step 2 We show that G3 is a representation of E . First, we show that E(S) ⊆ EG3(S)
for all S ∈ P0(N ). Let S ∈ P0(N ) and B ∈ E(S). We distinguish three cases:
(a) |S| ≥ 2. Choose σ S such that f i = (S, B) for all i ∈ S. Then the coalition S is
formed and hence by definition of π3, π3(σ S, τ N\S) ∈ B for all τ N\S ∈ N\S3 .
So, B(σ S) ⊆ B.
(b) S = {i}, with i = 1, 2. Choose σ i such that f i = ({i}, B) and φi is such that
φi (B ′) ∈ B for all B ′ with B ′ ∩ B = ∅.
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If τ N\{i} is such that f j = RT˜ for all j ∈ N\{i}, then player i is able to choose
from {x, y} for some x, y ∈ A and x = y. Since {x, y} ∈ E(N\{i}), superadditivity
implies A\{x, y} /∈ E(1). Hence B ∩ {x, y} = ∅, which means that φi will select an
alternative from B.
For all other τ N\{i} ∈ N\{i}3 , it is sufficient to note that coalition {i} forms. Thus,
by definition of π3, π3(σ i , τ N\{i}) ∈ B for all τ N\{i} ∈ N\{i}3 .
(c) S = {3}. It is sufficient to note that since E({1, 2}) = P0(A), superadditivity
implies that E(3) = {A}.
In order to prove the converse inclusion, let S ∈ P0(N ) and B ∈ EG3(S). Since
E(N ) = P0(A) and A ∈ E(S) for all S ∈ P0(N ), we can assume that S = N and
B = A. We show that B ∈ E(S). Let σ S ∈ S be such that B(σ S) ⊆ B. We only
treat the case |S| = 2 and σ S is such that f i = RT˜ for some RT˜ ∈ WT˜ and for all
i ∈ S. For all other cases, it is sufficient to note that G3 is an extension of G0.
If 3 /∈ S, then it is sufficient to note that E(S) = E({1, 2}) = P0(A).
If 3 ∈ S, then by construction B(σ S) = {x, y} for some x, y ∈ A and x = y. Since
{x, y} ∈ E(S), monotonicity implies that B ∈ E(S).
Step 3 It remains to prove that G3 is ex post consistent. Let RT ∈ WT . Consider
the following strategy profile s ∈ SN . For every t i ∈ T i and for all i ∈ N , s(t i ) =
(RT˜ , t i , 1, φi ), with φi chosen arbitrarily.
For case (i) in Step 1, all t1 ∈ T 1 prefer x to z and y to z and all t2 ∈ T 2 obtain
their preferred element from {x, y}. Hence these types have no incentive to deviate.
For case (ii) in Step 1, t1,1 ∈ T 1 prefers x and y to d and e, whereas t1,2 ∈ T 1
prefers d and e to x and y. Moreover, if r1 = t1,1, all t2 ∈ T 2 obtain their preferred
element from {x, y}, and if r1 = t1,2, all t2 ∈ T 2 obtain their preferred element from
{d, e}. Thus, none of these types is able to improve.
Since no t3 ∈ T 3 is able to affect the outcome under this strategy profile, we have
an EPE. unionsq
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